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Abstract
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented mainly by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards 
Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). In addition, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE), 
have their roles in safeguards. During 2019, STUK together with the ministries continued and 
further strengthened national cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation, export control and 
nuclear disarmament.
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in 
Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the 
shut-down research reactor in Espoo with nuclear fuel still at the site, as well as a dozen minor 
nuclear material holders in Finland.
A new category of nuclear material holder was initiated in 2018 owing to the decision of 
the MEAE that all production source material grade uranium in the metal industry must be 
licensed according to Finnish nuclear energy legislation. STUK therefore granted operating 
licences to the Boliden Group’s Zinc and Copper production units at Kokkola and Harjavalta, 
owing to the uranium-rich intermediate copper product. These operations and materials 
are not considered by the European Commission and are excluded from the EU Safeguards 
Regulation owing to the non-nuclear use of the source material. In 2019, Dragon Mining Oy 
was licensed for its uranium-rich gold concentrates.
STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear 
activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and 
Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks 
are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates 
the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in 
safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2019 continued to 
demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were 
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no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities, and the inspected materials and 
activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations.
The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. According to the 
statements on inspection results and the conclusion of safeguards implementation provided 
by the IAEA and the Commission, neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks or 
required any actions in 2019. At the end of 2018, however, there was an unresolved request for 
clarification concerning findings in environmental sampling carried out by the IAEA in April 
2018. The clarification was consequently prepared and provided to the IAEA in early 2019. In 
addition, there were a few other follow-ups pending owing to equipment maintenance needs 
that were resolved in the beginning of 2019. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy 
and control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the 
international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK is continuing 
with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related 
activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive 
political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is 
impossible to carry out a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The Finnish National 
Data Centre for the CTBT (FiNDC) is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so 
that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
Human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2019 was focused 
on comprehensive competence development taking into account the risk assessment of certain 
areas of expertise and the ability of personnel to cope at work. The objective is to ensure the 
necessary human resources now and in the future, and to develop the work and work flows to 
fulfil STUK’s strategy for 2018–2022. As a continuation of technical development work, due 
to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the 
Olkiluoto repository site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular 
passive gamma emission tomography and passive neutron albedo reactivity measurement for 
the verification of spent fuel.
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for 
authorities that represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or 
nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded projects to 
promote safeguards and regulators in Tanzania and Vietnam.
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Preface
Every year, STUK prepares the report on Implementing Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Finland. 
The main function of the report is to inform and share experiences with colleagues and 
interested parties on safeguards implementation.
In this current setting, Chapter 1 presents the Finnish system and the relevant stakeholders 
to new readers in a concise way. Chapter 2 presents the safeguards activities at the operators 
and other stakeholders. Development work and other activities are dealt with later in the 
report. STUK’s activities concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and nuclear 
disarmament are included in report.
The report is compiled by the staff members of the Safeguards Section of STUK. The 
inspectors in the office have specific oversight tasks and duties towards individual operators 
and stakeholders, so all staff members contribute to the reporting. In the Safeguards Section, 
there are a Section Head and seven inspectors as responsible officers for all facilities, 
installations and other NM or nuclear related activities. Inspectors work in pairs to ensure 
duplicate knowledge and appropriate response time. This arrangement also makes it easier 
for all individuals to handle their workload. In addition, one researcher who is developing 
measuring methods in the GOSSER project has been hired by the Section.
The Section Head is Marko Hämäläinen and the responsible officers for nuclear material 
holders in 2019 were Henri Niittymäki for Loviisa NPP, the Technical Research Centre of Finland 
(VTT) and minor NM holders, Timo Ansaranta for Olkiluoto NPP, Tapani Honkamaa for the 
new Olkiluoto 3 unit and the FV Hanhikivi NPP project, Mikael Moring and Olli Okko for the 
encapsulation plant and geological repository for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. Mr Moring 
acted as responsible officer for STUK as a nuclear material holder and Olli Okko for nuclear 
material producers and nuclear materials at the universities of Helsinki and Jyväskylä. Mr Okko 
was also responsible for nuclear fuel-cycle related R&D activities under the Additional Protocol.
In addition, there are several additional tasks related to safeguards and nuclear non-
proliferation, which are taken care of by various experts of STUK. In particular, the Support 
Programme to the IAEA safeguards contributes to the R&D work for international safeguards. 
Mr Honkamaa acts as support programme coordinator, prepares its annual report and draws 
attention to the highlights in this report. Mr Moring is responsible to the CTBTO for the 
Finnish National Data Centre and, of STUK’s other departments, Kari Peräjärvi contributes 
to the GICNT and IPNDV activities included in this report. It is important to highlight that 
Elina Martikka is continuing to contribute strongly to non-proliferation and safeguards issues 
in her current position as an international co-operation manager in the recently established 
Department for Expert Services. Ms Martikka works in close co-operation with the Safeguards 
Section and leads the working group of NPT partners at STUK. The contents of this annual 
report can be expected to reflect these changes in the future. Comments and suggestions are 
welcome to improve the content and normativity of the report.
The Editor
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1 Implementation of nuclear 
non-proliferation in Finland
The regulatory control of nuclear materials, nuclear safeguards, is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order for Finland to have a nuclear industry, most 
of which consists of nuclear energy production, it must be ensured that nuclear materials, 
equipment and technology are used only for their declared peaceful purposes. The basis of 
nuclear safeguards is the national system for the regulatory control of nuclear materials 
and activities. Nuclear safeguards represent an integral part of nuclear safety and nuclear 
security and are applied to both large- and medium-sized nuclear industry and to small-scale 
nuclear material activities. Along with the safeguards, the regulatory process for nuclear 
non-proliferation includes transport control, export control, border control, international 
cooperation and monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT).
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security 
and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved in a state 
nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials, often referred to as 
‘licence holders’ or ‘operators’ and the state authority, STUK. A licence holder must take good 
care of its nuclear materials and the state authority must provide the regulatory control 
to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control of nuclear expert 
organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive 
technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all 
these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy.
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in 
Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the 
research reactor in Espoo with nuclear materials, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material 
holders in Finland. Most of the applied nuclear research and development activities are carried 
out to improve the maintenance and safety of the nuclear power plants.
1.1 International safeguards agreements 
and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international agreements, the most important and extensive 
of which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
NPT). The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is 
the basis for the nuclear safeguards system of the European Union (EU). Finland is bound by 
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both of these treaties, and also has several bilateral agreements in the area of the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy. When Finland joined the EU, the bilateral agreements with Australia, Canada 
and the USA were partly replaced by the corresponding Euratom agreements (see Appendix 3 
for the relevant legislation).
Finland was the first state where an INFCIRC/153-type comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 9 February 1972). When Finland 
joined the EU (1 January 1995), this agreement was suspended and subsequently the Safeguards 
Agreement between the non-nuclear weapon Member States of the EU, the Euratom and 
the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in Finland on 1 October 1995. Finland signed the 
Additional Protocol (AP) to the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 September 1998 with the other 
EU Member States and ratified it on 8 August 2000. The Additional Protocol entered into force 
on 30 April 2004, once all the EU Member States had ratified it. The scope and mandate for 
Euratom safeguards are defined in the European Commission Regulation No. 302/2005.
After Finland joined the EU as a Member State and thereby subjected itself to the Euratom 
safeguards, a comprehensive national safeguards system continued to be maintained and 
further developed. The basic motivation for this is the responsibility assumed by Finland for 
its safeguards and security under the obligations of the NPT, and also to ensure fulfilment of 
the Euratom requirements.
The national safeguards derive their mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear Energy 
Act and Decree. The operator’s obligation to have a nuclear material accountancy system 
and the right of STUK to oversee the planning and generation of design information for new 
facilities was introduced from STUK requirements into the Nuclear Energy Decree.
In 2015, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended in such a way that the government decrees 
on nuclear safety, nuclear waste management, emergency preparedness and nuclear security 
were replaced by new STUK regulations. In addition, the new STUK regulation on the Safety 
of Mining and Milling Operations Aimed at Producing Uranium or Thorium also entered into 
force on 1 January 2016.
As stipulated by the act, STUK issues detailed requirements (the YVL Guides) on 
safety, security and safeguards that apply to the use of nuclear energy. STUK’s safeguards 
requirements for all users of nuclear energy during all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle are set in 
Guide YVL D.1 Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards issued in 2013. The guide was updated 
in 2018, and a new version was published in 2019. Areas covered in the new comprehensive 
guide include the obligations and measures stemming from the Additional Protocol for 
the Safeguards Agreement and from recent developments. All stakeholders must describe 
their own safeguards system in written form (as a nuclear materials handbook or safeguards 
manual), in order to facilitate their task of fulfilling their obligations and to guarantee the 
effective and comprehensive operation of the national safeguards system. In the new guide, 
there are also specific national requirements for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a 
geological repository.
In general, nuclear safeguards control applies to:
• nuclear material (special fissionable material and source material)
• nuclear dual-use items (non-nuclear materials, components, equipment and technology 
suitable for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
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• licence holders’ activities, expertise, preparedness and competence including information 
security
• R&D and other activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle as defined in the Additional 
Protocol
• the design and construction of new nuclear facilities.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish safeguards system are the authorities and 
stakeholders. Undistributed responsibility for the safety, security and safeguards of the use 
of nuclear energy rests with the stakeholder. It is the responsibility of STUK as the state 
regulatory authority to ensure that the licence holders and all other stakeholders in the nuclear 
field comply with the requirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards agreements. To 
complement the national effort, international control is necessary in order to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the national safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsible for national non-proliferation policy and 
international agreements. The MFA is responsible for the export control of nuclear materials 
and other nuclear dual-use items, including sensitive nuclear technology. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) is responsible for the supreme command and 
control of nuclear matters. MEAE is responsible for the legislation related to nuclear energy 
and is also the competent authority mentioned in the Euratom Treaty. Other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, also contribute to the efficient 
functioning of the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is responsible for maintaining the national 
nuclear safeguards system in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. STUK 
regulates the stakeholders’ activities and ensures that the obligations of international 
agreements concerning the peaceful use of nuclear materials are met. Regulatory control by 
STUK includes the possession, use, production, transfer (national and international), handling, 
storage, transport, export and import of nuclear materials and nuclear dual-use items. STUK is 
in charge of Finland’s approval and consultation process for inspectors from the IAEA and the 
European Commission.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials Section of STUK cover all typical measures of 
the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), together with 
many other activities. STUK reviews the stakeholders’ reports (operational notifications, 
inventory reports), inspects their accountancy, facilities and transport arrangements on site, 
and performs system audits. STUK runs a verification programme for nuclear activities to 
assess the completeness and correctness of the declarations by the licence holders. STUK acts 
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proactively in order to avoid or solve in advance any foreseeable issues that may be raised by 
the international inspectorates. Nuclear safeguards on the national level are closely linked to 
other functions of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, export control, 
border control, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, physical protection of nuclear 
materials, monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Nuclear safety and particularly 
nuclear security objectives are closely complemented by safeguards objectives. For this reason, 
the research and regulatory units in the fields of safety, security and safeguards at STUK 
cooperate within the non-proliferation framework. The scope of non-proliferation work is 
linked to many organisational units of STUK (Fig. 1).
The distribution of the working hours of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section in the 
different duty areas is presented in Figure 2. Most of the working days are invoiced to the 
stakeholders. As seen in Figure 2, the duty areas are divided into those of direct oversight and 
inspections (basic operations), support functions including maintenance, development work 
for the regulatory functions and consultancy, including international cooperation financed by 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or the European Union. However, the state budgetary funding 
constitutes only about 5% of the total funding of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section.
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an international domain. STUK therefore actively 
participates in international nuclear safeguards-related cooperation and development efforts, 
and also participates in the European Safeguards Research and Development Association 
ESARDA’s working groups, executive board and steering committee. The practices adopted in 
the current nuclear construction projects have emphasised the need to bring in the safeguards 
requirements at an early stage of facility design. The experience has been shared with the 
IAEA, in several international fora and also in bilateral cooperation with several countries.
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FIGURE 1. Framework to implement nuclear non-proliferation within STUK’s organisation.
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FIGURE 2. The distribution of the working hours of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section in the various duty areas.
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1.2.3 Licence holders and other users of nuclear energy
The essential parts of the national safeguards system are the licence holders and other users 
of nuclear energy – in nuclear terminology, often called the operators and other stakeholders. 
In Finnish legislation, the term ’use of nuclear energy’ comprises a wide range of nuclear-
related activities, such as those defined in the Additional Protocol. These stakeholders, in 
particular the licence holders, perform key functions in the national safeguards system: control 
of the authentic source data of their nuclear materials in addition to accountancy for nuclear 
materials at the facility level for each of their material balance areas (MBA). Each licence 
holder or other user of nuclear energy must operate its safeguards system in accordance with 
its own nuclear materials handbook or safeguards manual. The requirements of the Additional 
Protocol are integrated into the handbook to facilitate implementation of safeguards at the 
site, including the material balance areas. Other stakeholders too, as users of nuclear energy, 
are required to have a safeguards manual to facilitate safeguards implementation. The nuclear 
materials handbook or safeguards manual is part of the operator’s quality system and is 
reviewed and approved by STUK.
In Finland, there are about 30 stakeholders responsible for nuclear material accountancy 
and control. The major material balance areas are listed in Table 1 and described in greater 
detail below. Most of the nuclear materials in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto. The amounts of nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
in 1990–2019 are presented in Figures 3 and 4. Currently there are six sites as referred to in 
the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear power plant sites, the geological repository site in 
Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical Research Centre of Finland, the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority and the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) submitted by a licence holder or by other 
stakeholder as groundwork, the European Commission adopts particular safeguards provisions 
(PSP) for that licence holder. PSPs are drawn taking operational and technical constraints into 
account in close consultation with both the person or undertaking concerned and the relevant 
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member state. Until PSPs are adopted, the person or undertaking must apply the general 
provisions of Commission Regulation No. 302/2005. A facility attachment (FA) is prepared in 
cooperation with the IAEA for each facility to describe arrangements specific to that facility. 
The status of the regulatory documents for the Finnish material balance areas is shown in 
Table 1.
TABLE 1. Status of regulatory documents for material balance areas in Finland at the end of 2019.
MBA, 
location
BTC, last 
upd.
Site (AP), 
founded
PSP, in force FA, in 
force
Licence/DiP,  
in force (from/until)
SG Manual,  
approved update
WL0V, 
Loviisa
15.5.2017 SSFL0V1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 4.5.1998 No Operating, LO1 until 
31.12.2027 LO2 until 31.12.2030
27.11.2019
W0L1, 
Olkiluoto
22.8.2018 SSFOLKI, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operating, until 31.12.2038 19.9.2019
W0L2, 
Olkiluoto
22.8.2018 SSFOLKI, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operating, until 31.12.2038 19.9.2019
W0LS, 
Olkiluoto
17.4.2019 SSFOLKI, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operating, until 31.12.2038 19.9.2019
W0L3, 
Olkiluoto
3.1.2019 SSFOLKI, 
8.7.2004
No No Operating, until 31.12.2038 19.9.2019
W0LE, 
Olkiluoto
24.6.2019 SSFPOSI, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 12.11.2015 No, included in 
W0LF manual
W0LF, 
Olkiluoto
9.12.2019 SSFPOSI, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 12.11.2015 22.8.2019
WFV1, 
Pyhäjoki
3.2.2017 No No No DiP, 1.7.2010 4.7.2014
WRRF, 
Espoo
31.12.2014 SSFVTTI, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 9.7.1998 No Operating, until 31.12.2023 12.4.2017
WNSC, 
Espoo
12.9.2019 Included 2017 
to SSF VTT1
No No Operating, until 31.12.2026 11.11.2019
WFRS, 
Helsinki
15.2.2019 SSFSTUK, 
8.7.2004
No No Not required (as an authority) 17.2.2017
WHEL, 
Helsinki
4.4.2019 SSFHYRL, 
8.7.2004
No No Operating, until 31.12.2027 3.9.2019  
WKK0, 
Kokkola
30.5.2013 No No No Operating, until 31.12.2024 18.6.2015
WNNH, 
Harjavalta
16.1.2018 No No No Operating, until 31.12.2029 15.11.2019
WTAL, 
Terrafame
25.5.2019 No No No Operating (pilot test) until 
30.6.2023
6.11.2017
WDPJ, 
Jyväskylä
10.3.2017 No No No Operating, until 31.12.2024 24.9.2018
 
Finnish material balance areas and their status as 31.12.2019. MBA (material balance area code), BTC (Basic Technical 
Characteristics, i.e. Design Information), AP (the Additional Protocol), PSP (Particular Safeguards Provisions set by the European 
Commission), FA (Facility Attachment prepared by the IAEA), DiP (Decision-in-Principle, date of Parliament approval, in force 5 
years).
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FIGURE 3. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1990–2019.
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FIGURE 4. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1990–2019.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
The nuclear power plant operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy is located on Hästholmen 
Island in Loviisa on the southeast coast of Finland. This first NPP was built in Finland in 
the 1970s to host two VVER-440 type power reactor units. These two units share common 
fresh and spent fuel storages. For nuclear safeguards accountancy purposes, the entire NPP is 
counted as one material balance area (MBA code WL0V).
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP is imported from the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. 
The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was returned to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation until 
1996 and since then has been stored in the interim storage due to a change in Finnish nuclear 
legislation, which forbids the import and export of nuclear waste in general, including spent 
fuel.
As per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, the Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOVI) 
comprises Hästholmen Island as a whole and extends to the main gate on the mainland. 
Particular Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which define the European Commission’s 
nuclear safeguards procedures for the facility, have been in force since 1998. The Facility 
Attachment of the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared by the IAEA for 
the Loviisa NPP.
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Major nuclear installations in Finland
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant unit Start-up National grid Nominal electric power 
(gross/net, MW)
Type, supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb 1977 9 May 1977 531/507 Pressurised water reactor (PWR),  
Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1981 531/507 Pressurised water reactor (PWR),  
Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Plant unit Start-up National grid Nominal electric power 
(gross/net, MW)
Type, supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR), Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR), Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Operating licence granted  
7 Mar 2019
Approx. 1,600 (net) Pressurised water reactor (PWR), Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki,  
and the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under commissioning.
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Hanhikivi nuclear facility project
Plant unit Supplemented  
Decision-In-Principle approved
Nominal electric power, 
net (MW)
Type, supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014 Approx. 1200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), ROSATOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and geological repository
The planned facility under construction will consist of a surface facility for the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel and  
a geological repository for disposal of the fuel at a depth of appr. 420 metres.
FiR 1 research reactor
Facility Thermal power In operation Fuel Triga fuel type
TRIGA Mark II  
research reactor
250 kW March 1962 – June 
2015
Reactor core consists 
of 80 fuel rods which 
contain 15 kg of uranium
Uranium–zirkonium hybrid 
combination: 8% uranium, 91% 
zirkonium and 1% hydrogen
The FiR 1 research reactor, operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, was commissioned in March 1962. VTT 
stopped using the reactor in June 2015 and placed it in permanent shutdown. VTT submitted the operating licence application 
for the decommissioning phase to the Government in June 2017.
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Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, W0L2, W0LS, and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and operates a nuclear power plant on Olkiluoto Island in 
Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power reactor 
units and an interim spent fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the electricity grid in 1978 
and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. There are three active material balance areas (MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, 
W0LS) at the Olkiluoto NPP.
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian Federation or in the EU, and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Germany and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence to construct a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 
3 in 2005. As a part of the licensing process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary measures 
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was approved by STUK. The European 
Commission has assigned the MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. TVO submitted the operating 
licence application to the Government in April 2016 and, consequently, the operating licence 
was granted on 7 March 2019. In the meanwhile, the first fresh fuel for the first loading was 
received to OL3 in October 2017 and the initial inventory was verified in February 2018. The 
current estimate for the beginning of energy production is in early 2021.
TVO owns most of the area of Olkiluoto Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLKI) as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol currently comprises the fenced areas around the 
reactor units, the spent fuel storage and the storage for low- and intermediate-level waste, and 
the Olkiluoto 3 construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions for the Olkiluoto NPP have 
been in force since 2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 
has not been prepared by the IAEA for the Olkiluoto NPP.
Fennovoima (MBA WFV1)
Fennovoima was founded in 2007 as a new nuclear power operator in Finland. The Government 
approved a Decision-in-Principle in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to construct a 
new nuclear power plant at a new site. The preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) 
were submitted to the European Commission in summer 2013, and the MBA code WFV1 was 
assigned to the future material balance area once the selection of the future Hanhikivi site 
at Pyhäjoki was decided upon. Fennovoima submitted the construction licence application 
to the Government in June 2015. Provision of the necessary information to STUK, required 
for a construction licence as per Section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, has been delayed. 
Fennovoima expects the construction licence to be granted in 2021. The first Hanhikivi site 
declaration (according to the Additional Protocol) will be submitted once the construction 
licence has been granted.
VTT (MBAs WRRF and WNSC)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at facilities other than nuclear power plants. 
The most significant of these facilities is the VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland) 
research reactor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF), located in Otaniemi, Espoo. The research reactor was 
the first nuclear reactor built in Finland. In 2012, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
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and VTT announced the plan to close down the reactor and to launch the decommissioning 
process. The reactor was shut down and made subcritical in 2015.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for VTT FiR1 since 1998. The Facility Attachment 
of the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared by the IAEA for the research 
reactor.
In contrast to this, a new building, the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, for experimental 
nuclear research was built at the Espoo premises of VTT. The preliminary BTC for the new 
building was submitted to the Commission at the end of 2014, and the MBA code WNSC was 
subsequently assigned to the future material balance area in 2015. STUK granted the operating 
licence in 2016 for the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, and nuclear materials were moved to the 
new building in 2017. Both these decisions for future decommissioning and construction will 
have long-lasting effects, due to the need for licences, permits, contracts and environmental 
impact assessment. This also affects safeguards, as the nuclear materials must be kept under 
the control of competent personnel in both material balance areas.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTTI), as per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, currently 
consists of the whole building around the research reactor, although there are non-nuclear 
companies and university premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
According to the nuclear energy decree, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) 
needs no licence as referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act for operations performed in its 
capacity as an authority, but STUK’s Nuclear Materials Section follows all the regulations and 
reporting practices in its capacity as nuclear material holder. The function of handling and 
possessing nuclear materials is set at a different department of STUK to the regulatory Nuclear 
Materials Section, which also provides oversight for this function. Small quantities of nuclear 
materials are stored by STUK, mainly materials no longer in use and hence taken into STUK’s 
custody. STUK was founded in 1958 and has been located at its current premises in Roihupelto, 
Helsinki, since 1994. The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK headquarters and the 
‘Central interim storage for small-user radioactive waste’ at the Olkiluoto NPP site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the premises of STUK’s headquarters located in Helsinki. The storage at Olkiluoto is included 
in the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of 
nuclear materials. The laboratory is located on the Kumpula university campus in Helsinki. The 
University’s internal structure was reorganised in 2017, and the current licence holder is the 
Department of Chemistry.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
the whole building housing the laboratory.
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Umicore Finland Oy (MBA WKKO)
The by-products of Kokkola Chemicals facility’s cobalt purification process contain uranium, 
which qualifies these by-products as nuclear material. Kokkola Chemicals has an operating 
licence to produce, store and handle nuclear material. In 2013, Freeport-McMoRan Copper & 
Gold Inc. acquired the ownership of the OM Group. The current operator since December 2019 
is Umicore Finland Oy, and the facility is located at Kokkola on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy operates the nickel refining plant at Harjavalta in western 
Finland. The plant was commissioned in 1959, expanded in 1995 and again in 2002. The refinery 
of Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta employs the technique of the sulphuric acid leaching of nickel 
products. Uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel products and currently stored at the 
site. The Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta company submitted the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
to the European Commission in 2010. In 2010, STUK granted a licence to extract and store less 
than 10 tonnes of uranium per year. The licence was renewed at the end of 2019 for a new 10-
year period.
Terrafame Oy (MBA WTAL)
In 2010, the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd mining company announced its interest in investigating 
the recovery of uranium as a separate product from its sulphide ore body at Talvivaara located 
in eastern Finland. The Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) were submitted to the European 
Commission in 2010, and the MBA code WTAL is assigned to the future uranium extraction 
plant that has been constructed as a separate part of the mineral processing plant. During 
2015, the state-owned company Terrafame took over the mining and milling operations at 
Talvivaara. At the end of 2016, the use of the uranium extraction plant was again included in 
the mining and mineral processing planning. STUK granted a licence for the small-scale pilot 
testing of the mineral processing techniques in December 2017 but the use of the extraction 
plant needs the operating licence to be granted by the Government. The application was 
submitted to the Government at end of October 2017 and was processed by the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Employment. STUK delivered its statement on the safety of the 
uranium extraction plant to the Ministry on 11 June 2019 based on the information required 
for construction licence as per Nuclear Energy Degree 62a§. The licence was granted by the 
Government on 6 February 2020 with a period for complaints. The MBA code WTAL is kept 
available for the nuclear material accountancy that was initiated with the pilot tests.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material holders in Finland. One of them is an actual 
material balance area: the University of Jyväskylä, Department of Physics ( JYFL, MBA code 
WDPJ), but in fact the nuclear material at JYFL has been derogated and exempted by the 
European Commission and the IAEA. Other minor nuclear material holders are members of a 
Catch-All-MBA (CAM), for the purposes of international nuclear safeguards. Most of these have 
depleted uranium as radiation-shielding material.
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Uranium may be concentrated in the mineral processing industry in intermediate or metal 
products with uranium concentration that fulfils the definition of nuclear material. These 
metal products that that are typical when, for example, processing sulphide ores with low 
uranium content, do not need to be included in the Euratom reporting because of their non-
nuclear use. In the process industry, the annual quantities of processed natural uranium are in 
the order of several kilogrammes or even tonnes. Typically, uranium is extracted from the main 
products and considered as harmful waste among other extracts. According to the definitions 
in Finnish nuclear energy legislation, the production and possession of source material has 
been licensed by STUK since 2018 after the interpretation and decision of MEAE in summer 
2018. Earlier, these kinds of stakeholders were not licensed by STUK, but a few gold companies, 
for example, have reported their uranium-rich gold production to STUK. Current licence 
holders are Boliden Kokkola Oy and Boliden Harjavalta Oy for the production and possession 
of uranium-rich copper cement originating from zinc concentrates, and Dragon Mining Oy for 
the production of uranium-rich gold concentrates at its Sastamala mill.
Posiva (MBAs W0LE and W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It was 
founded in 1995 and is owned by the nuclear power plant operators TVO and Fortum. Posiva 
was granted a licence by the Government in November 2015 to construct a disposal facility. 
Based on the drawings presented in the application, the preliminary BTCs were prepared for 
for the encapsulation plant and the geological repository and submitted to the Commission 
in 2013. The MBA codes assigned to the future facilities are W0LE for the encapsulation 
plant and W0LF for the geological repository. The construction of the geological repository 
(GR) commenced officially in 2016 and the encapsulation plant (EP) construction in 2019. 
From 2003 to 2016, Posiva was building an underground rock characterisation facility called 
Onkalo in Olkiluoto, and thus preparing for the construction of the disposal facility. The 
rock characterisation facility is now a part of the geological repository and constitutes the 
vehicle access ramp, three shafts and the technical support premises. In the IAEA safeguards 
approaches, it has been suggested that the geological formation should be under safeguards 
during the whole lifetime of the underground facility, beginning from the pre-operational 
phase. For this reason, long before becoming a nuclear material holder, Posiva was already 
required to develop a non-proliferation handbook, such as a nuclear materials handbook, to 
describe its safeguards procedures and reporting system.
The installation without nuclear materials but with the two BTCs for the Material Balance 
Areas under construction constitutes a site according to the Additional Protocol. The Posiva 
site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area around the buildings supporting the construction of the 
facilities.
Other stakeholders
Nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers that serve the nuclear and 
other industry are obliged to ensure that non-proliferation-sensitive technology does not 
get into the hands of unauthorised parties and thereby contribute to nuclear proliferation. 
The introduction of the Additional Protocol extended the scope of safeguards to the non-
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proliferation control of nuclear programmes and fuel cycle-related activities. These also 
include research and development activities not involving nuclear materials, but are related to 
the process or system development of fuel cycle aspects defined in the protocol. Additionally, 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 requires every state to ensure that 
export controls, border controls, material accountancy and physical protection are efficiently 
addressed, and calls on all states to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry 
and the public of their obligations. The control of nuclear expert organisations to ensure the 
non-proliferation and peaceful use of sensitive technology and dual-use items is a growing 
global challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the traditional nuclear material accountancy 
and reporting system, the main stakeholders of which are the international, regional and 
local authorities and the operators. In accordance with the extended non-proliferation regime 
and the amendments to the Finnish legislation, the stakeholders, universities, research 
organisations or companies that have activities defined in the Additional Protocol are under 
reporting requirements and export control. These stakeholders (the Technical Research Centre 
and a few universities) as users of nuclear energy are required to prepare a nuclear safeguards 
manual and to nominate persons responsible for nuclear safeguards arrangements.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom Safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission (Euratom safeguards) both have independent 
mandates to operate in Finland. These two international inspectorates have agreed on 
cooperation, which aims to reduce undue duplication of effort. The operators report to 
the Commission as required by Commission Safeguards Regulation No 302/2005. It is the 
Commission’s task to control the licence holders’ accounting and reporting systems. The 
Commission must draw up the particular safeguard provisions (PSP) to agree on the means of 
safeguards implementation, taking account of the operational and technical constraints of the 
licence holder.
The IAEA safeguards include traditional nuclear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and 
safeguards activities in accordance with the Additional Protocol, integrated together. While 
this should not lead to an increase in inspections, it should enable the IAEA to assure itself of 
the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the number of IAEA routine 
interim inspections is decreasing. In contrast to this, the IAEA additionally performs 1–3 
short-notice inspections per year in a state that has a number and type of nuclear installations 
similar to the situation in Finland. The IAEA has annually drawn conclusions confirming its 
confidence that all nuclear activities and materials are accounted for and are in peaceful use in 
Finland.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
defined in the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 
and 2008. At the trilateral meeting (IAEA/EC/STUK) in September 2013, it was agreed that no 
unannounced inspections with two hours’ notice time would be performed in Finland after the 
beginning of 2014. Thus, currently all short-notice inspections are expected to take place with 
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48 hours’ advance notice (see infobox). At reactors, the physical inventory verification includes 
both pre- and post-PIV inspections. In Loviisa, cask shipments are verified when the core is 
open. STUK continues with annual routines consisting of approximately 40 field inspections, 
which enables the effective safeguards implementation of the international inspectorates.
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, STUK must participate when the IAEA and 
Euratom are having inspections at Finnish facilities, so STUK has increased preparedness for 
short-notice and unannounced inspections and complementary access (abbreviated SNUICA). 
Every working day, one of STUK’s inspectors is prepared to attend a possible IAEA or Euratom 
inspection.
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and activities are the basis for state 
evaluation by the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional Protocol. In Finland, the state 
has delegated its responsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK has been nominated as 
a site representative, as per European Commission Regulation No. 302/2005. STUK collects, 
inspects and reviews the relevant information and then submits the compiled declarations in a 
timely fashion to the Commission and the IAEA.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a state nuclear safeguards system to ensure 
that nuclear materials and activities within the state are in accordance with the licence 
holders’ declarations, and that there are no undeclared activities. Such methods can provide 
information on the identity of the nuclear materials and confirm that licence holders’ 
declarations are correct and complete with respect to, for example, the enrichment of uranium 
and the burn-up and cooling time of nuclear fuel. The technical analysis methods in use are 
non-destructive assay (NDA), environmental sampling and satellite imagery.
IAEA/EU regular inspections:
Facilities and spent fuel storages at nuclear power plants (NPPs):
• Physical Inventory Verification (PIV)/Design Information Verification (DIV) 1/year
• Random Interim Inspection (RII) at 48-h notification (at least 1/year for Finland)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities (LOF)
• PIV/DIV 1/4–6 years
New reactors, under construction
• DIV and PIV later, as at the NPPs
Repository under construction
• PIV/DIV most likely 1/year
Complementary access at 2/24-h notification to verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
Euratom carries out additional inspections of the research reactor and MBAs at locations outside 
facilities (LOFs)
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1.5 Control of uranium and thorium production
Mining and mineral processing operations aiming to produce uranium or thorium are also 
under regulatory control. In order to carry out these activities, a licence and accounting system 
to keep track of the amounts of uranium and thorium are required. A national licence is also 
required to export and import uranium or thorium ore and ore concentrates. These activities 
are also controlled by the Euratom Supply Agency and the European Commission. Mining and 
milling activities and the production of uranium and thorium must be reported to STUK, the 
Commission and the IAEA.
1.6 Licensing and export/import control of dual-use goods
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, other nuclear fuel cycle-related activities in addition to 
nuclear materials are under regulatory control. A licence is required for the possession, transfer 
and import of non-nuclear materials, components, equipment and technology suitable for 
producing nuclear energy (nuclear dual-use items). The list of these other items is based on 
the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Part 1). The licensing authority 
is STUK. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for granting NSG Government-to-
Government Assurances (GTGA) when necessary. The ministry usually consults with STUK 
before giving the assurances. The licence holder is required to provide STUK with a list of the 
above-mentioned items annually. Moreover, the export, import and transfer of such items must 
be confirmed to STUK after the action.
Finland’s export control system is based on EU Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 
May 2009, which sets up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering 
and transit of dual-use items. This regulation was last amended in 2019 (Commission-
delegated regulation (EU) 2019/2199). The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Part 1 
and Part 2 items is regulated by the Finnish Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-use Goods. 
Authorisation is required to export dual-use items outside the European Union as well as for 
the EU internal transfers of NSG Part 1 items, excluding non-sensitive nuclear materials. The 
licensing authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Before granting an export licence, it also 
takes care of NSG Government-to-Government Assurances. The ministry asks STUK’s opinion 
on all applications concerning NSG Part 1 items.
1.7 Control of nuclear material transport
The requirements for the transport of radioactive material are set in the Finnish regulations 
on the transport of dangerous goods. The requirements are based on the IAEA Safety Standard 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, SSR-6, and their purpose is to 
protect people, the environment and property from the harmful effects of radiation during the 
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transport of radioactive material. Based on these regulations, STUK is the competent national 
authority for the regulatory control of the transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act 
sets specific requirements for the transport of nuclear material and nuclear waste. Generally, 
a licence granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. Usually the transport licences are 
granted for a fixed period, typically a few years. A transport plan and a transport security plan 
approved by STUK are mandatory for each consignment of nuclear material or nuclear waste. A 
certificate of nuclear liability insurance must also be delivered to STUK before transportation. 
Furthermore, a package may be used for the transport of fissile nuclear material only after the 
package design has been validated by STUK.
1.8 Nuclear safeguards and security strengthen each other
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory control of radiation and nuclear safety, 
security and safeguards (3S). All these three regimes have a common objective: the protection 
of people, society, the environment and future generations from the harmful effects of 
ionising radiation. As nuclear security aims to protect nuclear facilities’ sensitive or classified 
information, nuclear material and other radioactive material from unlawful activities, it is 
clear that the majority of the activities that aim at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
nuclear materials and sensitive nuclear technology contribute to nuclear security. Physical 
and information security measures at nuclear facilities and for nuclear materials including 
technology, sensitive information and knowledge also contribute to non-proliferation by 
providing deterrence, detection and delay of and response to nuclear security events. On the 
other hand, nuclear material accountancy and detection measures may supplement security 
measures through a deterrence effect.
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2 Safeguards activities in 2019
2.1 The regulatory control of nuclear materials
In 2019, as in the past, STUK continued with national safeguards measures and activities with 
66 inspection days and 42 inspections of material balance areas. The stakeholders’ activities 
were licensed and inspected as appropriate, and inventory reports and accountancies were 
verified systematically. The accumulation of nuclear material at the facilities is shown in 
Figures 3 and 4 and the verified nuclear material inventories at the end of 2019 are shown in 
Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix 1.
The implementation of the IAEA’s integrated safeguards since 2008 reduces the total 
number of annual routine inspections days of the international inspectorates, but includes 
short-notice random inspections. Since 2010, the number of IAEA and European Commission 
inspections annually has been close to 20 with approximately 25 inspection days. The 
fluctuation is mainly due to the different design information verification activities at the 
disposal site during each of the years. In October 2019, there was an extensive campaign 
at construction site resulting in a high number of inspections days in Finland. In 2019, the 
IAEA launched more short-notice inspections in Finland than ever before, three short-notice 
random inspections (SNRI) at Olkiluoto, one at Loviisa, and one complementary access (CA) 
at Olkiluoto. The development of inspections and inspection person-days at material balance 
areas is presented in Figures 5 and 6. Inspections by STUK, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission in 2019 are presented in Appendix 2.
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FIGURE 5. The number of inspections from 2004 to 2019.
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The implementation of safeguards in Finland was addressed at several meetings with the 
IAEA and the European Commission. During the IAEA General Conference in September 2019, a 
trilateral meeting was organised in Vienna. A trilateral meeting at least once a year and usually 
supplemented by a smaller trilateral meeting in spring is a useful informal forum for every 
organisation to discuss, share information and clarify state declarations. In addition, STUK 
experts met IAEA officials to discuss actual topics like implementing the State-Level Concept 
at Finnish facilities in connection with other meetings or occasions in Vienna. Similarly, in 
addition to the inspection routines, STUK continued with two annual safeguards meetings 
with each of the NPP operator’s staff members responsible for safeguards.
2.2 General safeguards activities
2.2.1 Additional Protocol declarations
In 2019, STUK compiled licence holders’ reports using the PR3 software provided by the IAEA, 
and submitted the annual updates for national declarations according to articles 2.a.(iii) and 
2.a.(viii) on 28 March 2019, and the declarations according to articles 2.a.(i), 2.a.(iv), 2.a.(x) and 
2.b.(i) on 13 May 2019. Furthermore, STUK submitted the quarterly declarations on exports that 
are due in February, May, August and November.
On 21 January 2019, STUK submitted to the IAEA a declaration with a clarification upon 
request by the IAEA according to Article 2.c. In a statement dated 14 March 2019, the IAEA 
concluded that the response provided by STUK was acceptable and that the IAEA had no 
further questions on the matter.
2.2.2. Approvals of new international inspectors
In 2019, a total of 33 IAEA and 14 Commission inspectors, newly appointed, were approved to 
perform inspections at nuclear facilities in Finland.
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2.2.3 Nuclear dual-use items, export licences
In 2019, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 26 export licences for NSG Part 1 items:
• three for export of equipment for nuclear power plant to France and two to Sweden;
• nine for exporting nuclear technology (nuclear information) to EU countries, four to the 
USA and one to the Russian Federation;
• three to export software and training to China;
• two to export non-nuclear materials to China;
• one for exporting a fresh fuel assembly to the Russian Federation; and
• one licence for exporting of zirconium tubes (of two fresh fuel assemblies to be returned to 
the manufacturer for reparation) to Sweden.
2.2.4 Transport of nuclear materials
In 2019, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland from Germany, Sweden and the Russian 
Federation (Appendix 1, Table A1). In relation to these imports, STUK approved one transport 
plan and two transport packaging designs. STUK inspected fresh nuclear fuel consignments 
with two inspection being carried out in 2019.
2.2.5 International transfers of nuclear material
In 2019, TVO reported to STUK about its international fuel contracts, fuel transfers and 
fuel shipments. Based on the document inspection findings and on two audits of TVO’s 
international nuclear material transfer accountancy and control carried out on 10 January and 
4 December 2019, STUK concluded that TVO had complied with its safeguards obligations 
when purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing its international nuclear material transfers. 
Other operators purchase fuel as an end-product, so their accountancy does not need to cover 
the purchase chain abroad.
2.3 Safeguards implementation at the stakeholders
2.3.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
In 2019, STUK granted two licences for the import of nuclear dual-use items. In total, STUK 
performed eight safeguards inspections and one inspection of the safeguards system at the 
Loviisa NPP in 2019. A follow-up from a 2018 safeguards inspection was carried out together 
with the IAEA and European Commission, followed by work on camera installations on 22-24 
January 2019. A site inspection was performed on the 19 March 2019. In June 2019, one random 
interim inspection was carried out by the IAEA and Commission together. The refuelling 
outage at the Loviisa 2 reactor unit took place during the period 18 August – 13 September 2019 
and the outage at the Loviisa 1 reactor unit during the period 7–27 September 2019. STUK, the 
IAEA and the Commission performed a Physical Inventory Taking (pre-PIT) inspection before 
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the outages, on 31 July 2019. This inspection was carried out effectively within one working day, 
as was proven to be good practice the previous years. The Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) 
was carried out after the outage, on 9–10 October 2019. STUK identified the fuel assemblies 
in the reactor cores and item-counted the fuel assemblies in the loading ponds. The Loviisa 
2 core was inspected on 26 August 2019 and the Loviisa 1 core on 15 September 2019. A system 
inspection of the NPPs safeguards system was performed by STUK on 30–31 October 2019.
On the basis of its own assessment, that of the IAEA and of the Commission inspection 
results, STUK concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2019.
2.3.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
In 2019 STUK granted TVO four import licences for fresh nuclear fuel for the two operating 
units, seven licences to import non-fuel items and one licence for possessing items, and one 
licence for export of dismantled plant components to Studsvik, Sweden, for disposing and 
recycling purposes. TVO updated its nuclear materials handbooks, and the updates were 
approved by STUK.
The operating reactor units Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and the spent fuel storage of the TVO 
Olkiluoto power plant were subject to 18 safeguards inspections. In addition, the accountancy 
of the uranium batches in TVO possession abroad was inspected. In cooperation with the 
European Commission and the IAEA, STUK performed the inspections that comprise the 
physical inventory verification of the reactor units and the spent fuel storage, both before and 
after the annual outages on 16–17 April and 18–19 June, respectively. STUK performed the core 
verification inspection of both reactor units before the reactor core lid was closed.
STUK took part in the complementary access to the Olkiluoto site as well as in random 
interim inspections at the Olkiluoto 1 unit and the spent fuel storage, all initiated by the IAEA, 
together with the European Commission. Furthermore, the IAEA, EC and STUK performed 
physical inventory verification in the spent fuel storage. STUK performed a further interim 
safeguards inspection in the reactor unit 2 and a site declaration update verification inspection.
At the Olkiluoto 3 unit, the design information verification inspection together with the 
physical inventory verification inspection was carried out by the IAEA, EC and STUK on 19 
November.
On the basis of its own assessment and that of the IAEA and of the Commission inspection 
results, STUK concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2019.
2.3.3 The Hanhikivi nuclear power plant project
The Government granted a decision-in-principle in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima 
to construct a new nuclear power plant at a new site. STUK initiated negotiations with the 
operators and the European Commission as well as with the IAEA in 2011 to prepare for the 
implementation of safeguards in good time simultaneously with the facility development. As 
a consequence, the company could request the vendor organisations to facilitate safeguards 
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implementation, for example to improve proliferation resistance and facilitate nuclear 
material verification and surveillance at the future plant. In the meantime, Fennovoima 
created an organisation for safeguards and prepared for the implementation of safeguards.
Based on the meetings on the implementation of safeguards and the control of nuclear 
technology with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes that awareness and preparedness for 
safeguards procedures are at an adequate level in the new organisation preparing for the new 
NPP project and that Fennovoima fulfilled its current safeguards obligations in 2019.
2.3.4 VTT
At the Technical Research of Finland (VTT), the preparations for licensing the 
decommissioning of the research reactor and associated activities continued together with the 
initiation of new research activities at the Centre for Nuclear Safety where operations started 
in 2017 by moving the small amounts of nuclear material used in the laboratories located in the 
reactor building. Both buildings with separate material balance areas (MBA) were included in 
the updated site declaration in 2017. The BTC of the Centre for Nuclear Safety was updated in 
September 2019 as a result of the deputy director being changed.
STUK and the Commission verified the nuclear material inventories of both of VTT’s MBAs 
on 4 and 5 June 2019.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection results, STUK concluded that VTT complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2019.
2.3.5 STUK
STUK’s Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section made a nuclear material inspection at the 
operating unit at STUK on 18 December 2019. The operator needs to focus on following their 
written procedures for nuclear material bookkeeping and reporting. During 2020 special care 
should be taken to send the NM reports to the EC on time. However, it can be concluded that 
the operating unit at STUK fulfils the requirements for national safeguards arrangements.
2.3.6 University of Helsinki
STUK carried out safeguards inspection together with the European Commission on 6 June and 
verified the inventory of the University of Helsinki. The record keeping was addressed by the 
Commission and STUK. As a result of the inspection, the operator was requested to update its 
nuclear materials manual. The updated manual was approved by STUK in September 2019.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection results, STUK concluded that the University 
of Helsinki complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2019.
2.3.7 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2019, STUK inspected the reports from the minor nuclear material holders. The minor 
holders are requested to prepare their nuclear materials handbooks as required in the new 
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STUK requirements, i.e. in Guide YVL D.1. In total, two handbooks prepared by the minor 
holders were approved in 2019.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded that the minor nuclear material holders 
complied with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2019.
2.3.8 Front-end fuel cycle operators
The operators at Harjavalta and Kokkola nickel and cobalt factories report monthly to the 
European Commission and STUK. The extraction of uranium from industrial purification 
processes is considered to be a pre-safeguard activity so not subject to IAEA safeguards. In 2016, 
STUK and the Commission inspected the inventories and accountancy practices at both of the 
operators. During 2019, at Kokkola the ownership changed and, at Harjavalta, the operating 
licence was renewed, but the responsible personnel remained in place and the operators 
reported about their planned activities and monthly inventories according to safeguards 
requirements. On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded that these operators complied 
with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2019.
The metal processing industry was requested to be licensed for its uranium-rich intermediate 
products in 2017 as described in Chapter 1.2, so the zinc and copper production of Boliden 
company reported processed 853 kg of natural uranium originating from zinc concentrates in 
2019. The uranium ends up in the waste streams during the processing. Dragon Mining reported 
an amount of 12 kg of uranium in its gold production originating mainly from its Jokisivu mine. 
The uranium, of source material grade, is not used in industrial processes. STUK concluded that 
these operators complied with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2019.
In June 2017, Terrafame Ltd applied for an operating licence to carry out pilot tests to 
analyse the processing techniques to be applied in the uranium production within the 
company’s uranium extraction plant built in the mineral processing plant that currently 
produces nickel and zinc. The pilot tests were licensed by STUK just as for other minor holders 
possessing small amounts of natural uranium in December 2017. The nuclear safeguards 
manual and responsible persons for nuclear materials accountancy were therefore approved by 
STUK before granting the licence. During 2018, the first pilot test was carried out. The uranium 
remained in liquid form, but reached the grade of source material. The material balance area 
initiated monthly reporting in 2019. STUK concluded that this operator complied with its 
nuclear safeguards obligations in 2019.
The licence application for the operation of Terrafame’s uranium extraction plan was 
submitted by the operator to the government in October 2017. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment launched the process to evaluate the application within the desired 
timeline in June 2018. Within this process, STUK’s Safeguards Section approved Terrafame’s 
‘Plan for arranging the safeguards control that is necessary to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons’ that was submitted according to the Nuclear Energy Decree for STUK’s 
approval. STUK gave its statement on nuclear safety to the ministry in June 2019 after ass-
essing the safety documentation. In this context, the proposed update of Terrafame’s safe-
guards manual was postponed in order to include the foreseen needs from the IAEA and the 
Commission. The manual must be updated before the uranium extraction operations begin.
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2.3.9 The disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
The operator Posiva applied for a nuclear construction licence for the disposal facility in 
2012. STUK assessed the application during 2013–2015 together with the Commission and 
the IAEA in order to clarify and facilitate safeguards measures for the permanent disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel. The requirement document for the IAEA/EC equipment to be installed in 
the encapsulation plant was jointly prepared by the IAEA and EC in 2014. This requirement 
document was referenced in the STUK assessment of the licence application.
In 2019, Posiva updated the BTCs both for the encapsulation plant and the geological 
repository. In particular, the layout of the encapsulation plant was updated in June 2019. As 
a consequence, the plans for the safeguards equipment to be installed at the encapsulation 
plant was updated by the IAEA and the Commission. The changes in the layout and their 
influence on the details of the equipment selection, emplacement and connections were 
discussed jointly at several meetings, and at a site visit carried out at Olkiluoto in June 2019. 
This ‘Safeguards-by-Design’ process can be expected to continue during the construction of the 
facility.
The underground construction for the non-nuclear technical servicing parts such as 
parking halls, personnel shafts, etc. continued during 2019. In addition, the construction of 
nuclear parts where nuclear material will be stored or transferred in the installation began 
simultaneously by excavating an access tunnel to the canister shaft, canister transfer tunnels, 
canister storage, etc. There were more than 10 active concurrent construction locations 
underground, challenging the timing of a design information verification campaign in 2018 
and 2019. At ground level, the foundation work for the encapsulation plant continued, the 
construction of the plant began in June 2019, and its foundation stone was laid at a festive 
ceremony in September.
In October 2019 the IAEA and the Commission carried out an extensive design information 
verification campaign to verify the underground premises constructed since the previous 
inspection in 2017. In addition, the status of the construction of the encapsulation plant was 
verified and the hoist and ventilations buildings with shaft connections underground were 
visited. Posiva updated the BTC for the underground installation to include the above-ground 
buildings in December. STUK carried out an inspection of the Posiva site on 14 February 2019 
and a DIV inspection of the MBAs W0LF and W0LE on 9 December 2019.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection results, STUK concluded that Posiva complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2019.
2.3.10 Other stakeholders
Research organisations and universities provided STUK with their annual declarations on 
research and development work. After its review, STUK prepared the annual declaration based 
on the Additional Protocol to the IAEA within the time limit of 15 May.
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3 Development work in 2019
3.1 Development of working practices
STUK started a new strategy period in 2018. The new strategy aims at a change involving the 
entire philosophy. In the new strategy period 2018–2022, the activities of STUK will be guided 
by effectiveness. Methods for achieving effectiveness include risk-oriented commensurable 
oversight and flexible and efficient working methods. Increased emphasis on operator 
responsibility forms the basis of this strategy. To meet the objectives of the new strategy, STUK 
needs to invest in the competence and well-being of its personnel. In the nuclear safeguards 
section, these have been taken into account, for example in developing job rotation inside the 
section, encouraging pair- and teamwork, seeking opportunities in training and competence 
building and in sharing knowledge. Part of this approach is a contribution to the international 
multidisciplinary tasks supporting safeguards, safety and security.
The change in oversight and increased emphasis on operators’ responsibility aim for 
increased trust and a culture in which operators accept the responsibility for safety, and 
find and propose viable solutions for ensuring and improving safety. Another objective is to 
have a critical look at STUK’s requirements for operators. With regard to safeguards, STUK’s 
regulatory guide D.1 for nuclear material holders and other stakeholders was updated in 2018 
and the new version issued in 2019 to highlight the responsibilities of operators to better meet 
these strategic objectives.
Nuclear materials safeguards implemented by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section of 
STUK cover all typical measures of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (SSAC), and many other activities besides. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked with the other functions of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: 
licensing, export control, border control, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, the 
physical protection of nuclear materials, and monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The continuous analysis of the developments in the involved 
fields of both technology and politics is a daily, multidisciplinary task in the STUK Nuclear 
Materials Safeguards Section.
In the Safeguards Section, there are a Section Head and seven inspectors who are 
responsible officers for all facilities, installations and other nuclear material or nuclear-related 
activities. Inspectors work in pairs to ensure duplicate knowledge and appropriate response 
time. This arrangement also makes it easier for all individuals to handle their workload.
As the licensed construction of the disposal facility began in 2016, the preparatory work at 
the authority focused on timely implementation of safeguards, in particular the equipment 
infrastructure to be fitted to the encapsulation and disposal process. The development of 
passive gamma emission tomography continued in cooperation with national experts at the 
Helsinki Institute of Physics and, also within the support programme to the IAEA. Within this 
context, Master’s thesis work was successfully finalised in 2019.
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In Finland, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) play a role in safeguards. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for the international aspects of Finland’s non-proliferation policy in collaboration with other 
authorities. The export control of nuclear products also falls within the ambit of the MFA. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) is responsible for the supreme 
command and control of nuclear matters. STUK together with the ministries strengthened 
cooperation in the area of non-proliferation, export control and disarmament. As a joint 
activity, STUK experts participate in Nuclear Suppliers’ Group’s Technical Expert Group 
meetings.
3.2 Support programme to the IAEA safeguards
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) is financed by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and coordinated by STUK. The objective of FINSP is to provide the IAEA 
with support in well-managed tasks related to the development of safeguards verification 
methods, safeguards concepts and IAEA inspector training. FINSP held two review meetings 
with the IAEA in 2019. The annual review meeting was held on 26 April 2019 and semi-annual 
review meeting on 22 October, both in Vienna. At the end of 2019, FINSP had 15 active tasks and 
one stand-by task.
The FINSP prepares a separate annual report to the ministry. Some highlights of the 2019 
activities are provided in the following text.
Performance Evaluation and Implementation Support of Gamma Emission Tomography for 
Spent‐Fuel Verification
Passive Gamma Emission Tomography is a method which can detect individual missing pins 
even from the inner parts of a spent fuel assembly. The IAEA approved the method in 2017 
and is in the process of procuring verification instruments. FINSP provides support to the 
IAEA in putting the new method into practice. This includes organising access to spent fuel 
ponds in order to perform the needed testing. In addition, the MSSP participates in the tests as 
observers in order to provide feedback from regulatory and operations perspectives and expert 
support in that regard. Campaigns were arranged in 2018 at Loviisa and Olkiluoto. The task 
was completed on 25 April 2019 but work continues in the task JNT A 2414 FIN “Support for the 
testing of PGET new functionalities in attended, remote and unattended modes”. In the new 
task a test campaign at Olkiluoto spent fuel storage was arranged in July 2019. The campaign 
was the first opportunity to verify spent BWR fuel with long (almost 40-year) cooling times. 
PGET was used in the modular verification system together with another novel method - PNAR 
(Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity). PNAR test campaign results were reported to the IAEA 
in November 2019 at the EPGR LLLC (Encapsulation Plant Geological Repository Low-Level 
Liaison Committee) meeting.
FINSP also arranged a meeting in Finland to assist the IAEA in the delivery of new 
commercial PGET instruments. The first commercial PGET unit was delivered to the IAEA in 
2019.
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FIGURE 7. Setting up the measurement campaign with PGET and PNAR at Olkiluoto spent fuel storage, July 2019.
In 2019 the IAEA arranged a challenge where it sought submissions from the public to 
enhance the software used to analyse PGET data. FINSP sponsored Rasmus Backholm to 
participate in the challenge. The software used and developed by Mr Backholm was initially 
written by the Helsinki Institute of Physics and later developed in STUK. Mr Backholm won 
the 2nd prize in the challenge and gave a presentation at the award ceremony in Vienna on 30 
September 2019.
Disposal programmes for spent nuclear fuel and the ASTOR group
The programmes for a geological repository for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden and Finland have 
reached the licensing phase, and the safeguards measures must be agreed on by all parties: 
facility designers, operators and inspectorates. The implementation of safeguards measures 
has been discussed in several fora. The Experts’ Group Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories (ASTOR) provided the IAEA with a draft report mainly on potential methods that 
can be applied to safeguard geological repositories. The report (STR-384) was published by 
the IAEA in August 2017. This task of SAGOR/ASTOR, which had been in effect for 30 years, 
was formally closed after the report. However, the IAEA created a new task to consolidate the 
earlier reports and findings of the Experts’ Group. The purpose of the task was not to create any 
new information but to consolidate existing information. The document is written in the form 
of questions and answers based on more than 90 reports published over 30 years.
At the end of April, the IAEA organised a workshop where most of the consolidation work 
was accomplished. The workshop was attended by experts from Finland, Sweden, the USA, 
Belgium, Germany and the European Commission. When reviewing and consolidating the 
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reports from the 1990s, the Additional Protocol and its terminology and measures were not 
properly incorporated into the report and future guidance. FINSP concern about final disposal 
is that the application of safeguards will become too resource-intensive for both inspectorates 
and operators. The optimisation of traditional and integrated safeguards measures should 
have been addressed more deeply in the group. One of the purposes of the task is to take care of 
knowledge management at the IAEA. This is achieved by collecting and assessing the selected 
references in the documents placed on the ASTOR group’s internal website. The final report 
of the task is not a recommendation and does not express any official position of the IAEA or 
participating MSSPs.
 Unfortunately, the ASTOR group was too slow and bureaucratic to assist in the practical 
implementation of safeguards within the timelines for the construction of the disposal facility 
at Olkiluoto so, in 2012, the IAEA-EC Lower Level Liaison Committee Meeting recommended 
that a Task Force be formed, which would coordinate the activities of the EPGR (Encapsulation 
Plant and Geological Repository) project and include representatives from the IAEA, EC, 
Sweden and Finland. In 2019, the European Commission hosted the 7th EPGR meeting in 
February in Luxembourg and the IAEA organised the 8th meeting in November in Vienna. 
ASTOR remained at the generic level whereas the EPGR group has access to the facility-specific 
design information and applies and develops the current safeguards approaches to the Finnish 
project.
Development of safeguards guideline for facilities under decommissioning and post-accident 
facilities
Two consultancy meetings were held in 2019 to improve the revision of existing DIQ templates 
for facilities under decommissioning. For Finland, and especially considering the VTT Research 
Reactor currently under decommissioning, these considerations such as those regarding 
essential equipment were beneficial. A major goal for the next consultancy meeting will be 
to establish and review an adequate DIQ example for spent fuel encapsulation plant and 
geological repository. The task continues in 2020.
New task: Safeguards-by-Design for Small Modular Reactors (SMR)
There is much interest in small modular reactors (SMRs) in Finland. Active Finnish SMR 
practitioners are Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology (LUT), which has proposed 
a SMR design for district heating, Fortum and the Technical Research Centre of Finland 
(VTT). STUK is an active member of the SMR regulators forum. This task will identify the key 
technical challenges for safeguards implementation involving SMRs, and steps that can be 
taken to support incorporating Safeguards by Design principles into SMR designs and IAEA 
safety guidance.
3.3 Spent fuel disposal and Gosser R&D project
The disposal of spent fuel requires that safety, data security and other security arrangements 
and the safeguards required to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be properly 
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implemented at a national level. For this purpose, STUK launched GOSSER (Geological 
Disposal Safeguards and Security) to finalise the Finnish concept for safeguarding the 
geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in 2016. The first project period ended in 2018 and the 
final report was prepared to describe the national safeguards concept for spent fuel disposal in 
Finland.
According to the national safeguards concept prepared, it is proposed that all fuel be 
verified in a comprehensive manner and with the available system comprising a PGET and 
PNAR (Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity) verifier. The NDA system should be an instrument 
in joint use between the IAEA, EC and STUK. On the other hand, on the C/S-side STUK can rely 
on technical surveillance and the safeguards conclusions of the international inspectorates. For 
STUK’s independent conclusions STUK can also make use of the information collected by its 
resident inspectors, inspection programme and environmental monitoring networks.
International inspectors do not plan to routinely follow nuclear material at the disposal 
depth. STUK has a different position here. In terms of safety, security and safeguards (3S), 
STUK will check that Posiva performs underground activities according to approved plans 
and STUK will utilise the same inspection effort to collect relevant information for all 3Ss. 
Examples of information most relevant to safeguards are data proving that the canisters 
are placed undamaged in the correct positions as declared to STUK and data showing that 
backfilling and sealing have been done in the approved manner. How this is efficiently and 
effectively arranged is under discussion.
The GOSSER project will now continue to the second phase. The programme is planned for 
the period 2019–2022. The plan is now going into greater details and includes the development 
of technologies and refining the national safeguards approach.
3.4 Pilot Blockchain-based system for nuclear 
material accounting and control
STUK in cooperation with the Henry L. Stimson Center and University of New South Wales 
have prepared the world’s first pilot system for blockchain-based nuclear material accounting 
and control, SLAFKA, in Finland. Based on the internal STUK database SAFKA, SLAFKA 
is a prototype distributed ledger technology (DLT) platform that offers great potential 
to significantly strengthen nuclear material accountancy by ensuring data immutability, 
improving the efficiency of materials tracking, and engendering a greater sense of participation 
among different parties. DLT is the use of replicated, synchronised data shared across 
multiple ‘nodes’ to track the transaction of assets. Emerging from IAEA and non-proliferation 
stakeholders’ interests in enhancing nuclear safeguards through technological advancements, 
SLAFKA arose from interest in testing applications of DLT to nuclear safeguards. In the case 
of placing spent fuel in geological repositories, the significance of data integrity is immense. 
SLAFKA offers assurance of the integrity of accounting records and measurements when 
physical verification is impossible. Additionally, as new cyber threats emerge every day, STUK 
and Euratom’s current systems become increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. Through 
hashing and data encryption, SLAFKA’s DLT-based platform fortifies these systems from 
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cyberattacks and any fraudulent data modification. Strengthening security not only benefits 
regulators, but also increases incentives for reporting, so SLAFKA has the potential to benefit 
all participants in safeguards reporting. The small-scale study SLAFKA was launched in March 
2020.
3.5 International cooperation for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
The state’s regulatory authority plays an important role in implementing safeguards at a 
national level, and also in contributing to and participating in the international fora to share 
experiences and interact with other parties. Participating in international events with a 
suitable contribution is also the best training for safeguards inspectors. Resources are limited, 
so the selection of the events is important.
International organisations ESARDA and INMM
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association 
(ESARDA) and has appointed experts to its committees and most of the working groups. 
STUK is a board member in the ESARDA Executive Board. A STUK expert is Vice Chair of the 
Implementation of Safeguards Working Group. Two STUK experts participated in the ESARDA 
Reflection Group that is reviewing the ESARDA administrative practices and formulating 
new short- and long-term strategies for ESARDA. These were presented at the ESARDA 50th 
Anniversary Symposium in May 2019 by organising a Word Café introduction and presentation 
of the new strategy. The aim is to continuously follow the needs of the ESARDA members. 
STUK experts also made a few presentations and other contributions at the Institute of 
Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) annual meeting in July 2019 in Palm Springs, USA. 
The outcome of the ESARDA strategy work was also presented at the INMM meeting by the 
Reflection Group members.
The 9th INMM/ESARDA/INMMJ Joint Workshop Future Challenges for the Enhancement 
of International Safeguards and Nuclear Security was held in Tokyo, Japan in October 2019. 
STUK was contributing by chairing the session on effective and efficient safeguards for facility 
decommissioning and long-term waste management.
The back-end of the fuel cycle was also focused on by the ESARDA Reflection Group, and a 
new ESARDA WG for final disposal was established in 2019. The first meeting was held at the 
beginning of 2020 in connection with ESARDA administrative meetings.
Services for authorities abroad
STUK continued supporting NRRC’s (the regulatory authority of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 
safeguards functions. In 2019, STUK provided assistance in the procurement process of nuclear 
material bookkeeping software.
Two EU-funded projects were launched in 2016 to support the nuclear regulators in Vietnam 
and Tanzania as these countries are aiming at nuclear power and uranium mining, respectively. 
The kick-off meetings were held in 2016 and the cooperation is scheduled to continue for at 
least 2–3 years. In 2019, the EU-funded project to support the nuclear regulator in Vietnam 
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(VARANS) was finalised. In the 3-year project, STUK was the single contributor to the task 
on nuclear safeguards. During 2019, the nuclear regulator of Tanzania (TAEC) published 
its safeguards regulation among other regulations to enhance the regulatory framework in 
Tanzania. In 2019, STUK contributed to a new EU-funded project that covers the security and 
border control of radioactive and nuclear materials in several African countries.
NPT Preparatory Committee
The Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. The Treaty includes more than 190 
countries around the world. The Treaty Review Conference is held every five years, the previous 
one in 2015 and the next in 2020. Before the Review Conference, preparatory meetings will 
be held. STUK's expert, together with Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment, Ministry of Defence and other organisations, attended a preparatory 
meeting in May 2019 in New York.
NSG – Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multilateral export control regime and a group of 
nuclear supplier countries that seek to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export 
of materials, equipment and technology that can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. It 
has 48 participating governments. Finland is represented by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 
the NSG forum. STUK’s experts attended to the NSG Technical Expert Group meetings in 2019.
GICNT – Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear Security activities often include cooperation between multiple authorities. Nuclear 
Security also has a strong international linkage. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, GICNT, established in 2006, is one of the most important international fora for 
nuclear security. Currently 89 states and six international organisations participate in the 
work of GICNT. Member states’ nuclear security capabilities and cooperation are developed, 
for example, by organising exercises. The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs coordinated 
the work of GICNT until the summer of 2019. Since then, Finland has continued in the GICNT 
Leadership Team with Special Advisor status. STUK continues to serve as the Ministry’s 
technical advisor.
IPNDV – International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification
The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) was established 
on the initiative of the United States in 2014. The IPNDV develops methods and procedures 
for the verification of nuclear disarmament. The second phase of IPNDV finished at the 
end of 2019. During the second phase, the scope was expanded to cover all steps of nuclear 
disarmament, i.e., unlike phase 1 it not only concentrated on verification of the dismantlement 
of a nuclear weapon. During the second phase, the work also become more concrete through 
exercises and measurements. The IPNDV is a US initiative and the other participants come 
from both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Finland has been participating in the 
IPNDV from the beginning. STUK’s tasks in IPNDV have always been connected to the 
development of technological verification methods.
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4 National Data Centre for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (FiNDC)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions 
in any environment. This ban is aimed at constraining the development and the qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons, including the development of advanced new types of nuclear 
weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and was opened for 
signature in New York on 24 September 1996. It will enter into force after it has been ratified 
by the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states participated in the 1996 session of the 
Conference on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or research reactors.
A global verification regime is being established in order to monitor compliance with 
the CTBT. The verification regime consists of the following elements: the International 
Monitoring System (IMS), a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and 
confidence-building measures. The IMS is almost 90% ready and the CTBTO certified its 300th 
monitoring station out of a total of 337 in December 2019. The worldwide station network 
provides data to more than 1,200 organisations in more than 120 countries. In addition to 
monitoring compliance with the treaty, the data from the IMS is used in disaster mitigation. 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) actively provides data 
to the global Tsunami Warning System and, since 2012, the CTBTO has been a member of the 
Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE) and a co-sponsor 
of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organisations 
( JPLAN) led by the IAEA. Within this framework, the CTBTO is responsible for gathering and 
providing close-to-real-time radionuclide monitoring data to the IAEA and other participating 
organisations.
Finland signed the CTBT on its inaugural day in 1996 and ratified it less than three years 
later. In addition to complying with the basic requirement of the CTBT of not carrying out 
any nuclear weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the development of the verification 
regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
STUK has two roles: it operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the 16 
radionuclide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most important task of the FiNDC is to 
inspect data received from IMS and inform the national authority about any indications of a 
nuclear test explosion. The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the IMS by providing 
support in radionuclide analyses and in quality control of the radionuclide station network. 
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The third major national collaborator is the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station (PS17 in Sysmä) and provides analysis of 
waveform IMS data.
4.1 International cooperation the 
foundation of CTBT verification
Before the opening of the CTBT in 1996, the world had seen more than 2,000 nuclear tests. 
In the more than 20 years since then, there have been only eight, six of which were by the 
DPRK. Since 2017 no activities pointing to clandestine nuclear testing have been detected 
by the network or otherwise. This is a strong indicator of the de facto strength of the treaty 
that has yet to come into force. However, until it does, it lacks full power. After the Nyonoksa 
(Archangel) radiation accident in northwest Russia in August 2019, IMS radionuclide stations 
in Russia paused delivery of data to the network, referring to, for example, the preparatory 
status of the CTBT and thus the voluntary status of upholding the IMS stations. This 
effectively hindered detection in the network of any radionuclides from the accident, as the 
winds blew any possible activity released into the atmosphere towards south and southeast, 
making it practically undetectable outside Russia. That this could be done without significant 
pushback from the international community is one more indication of the importance of 
implementing the CTBT.
In 2019, the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) participated in workshops and meetings 
of the Working Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy-making organ for the 
technical development of the verification regime. By participating in the work of WGB and its 
subsidiaries (workshops and expert groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise to the 
CTBTO, while also attending to Finnish national interests.
4.2 The analysis pipeline is a well-established daily routine
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide measurement data generated at IMS 
radionuclide stations across the world. The analysis pipeline for the air filter monitoring 
data is linked to the LINSSI database and equipped with an automated alarm system to 
enable efficient and fully automated screening of the data. Radioxenon measurements are 
especially important for CTBT verification because xenon, as a noble gas, may also leak from 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Status (31 December 2019)
• CTBT Member States 184
• Total Ratifications 168
• Annex 2 Ratifications 36
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underground tests, which seldom release particulate matter. The operational stations generate 
more than 1,000 gamma and beta-gamma spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis pipeline to 
handle. The pipeline is well-established and has been running stably for many years.
Xenon radioisotopes released from medical isotope production facilities and NPPs are 
regularly measured all around the globe. Anthropogenic nuclides with CTBT relevance, mainly 
99Tc, 131I from medical isotope production and 137Cs from the Chernobyl and Fukushima fallouts, 
are regularly detected at some particulate stations.
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5 Summary
STUK continued its nuclear regulatory authority role in 2019 by licensing and inspecting the 
national stakeholders. STUK maintained the national safeguards system including the SSAC 
(State System of Accounting and Control) of nuclear materials, regulated the stakeholders’ 
activities and ensured that the obligations of international agreements concerning the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and activities were met. Most of the practical work comprises 
reviewing stakeholder applications, reports and notifications, but also periodical and ad 
hoc inspection are carried out for safeguards purposes. STUK prepared the national reports 
according to the safeguards agreement and its additional protocol. This report summarises 
these activities, but there are continuously parallel development activities and international 
cooperation in the fields of safeguards and non-proliferation described in this report.
In the field, STUK continued with national safeguards measures and activities in 66 
inspection days and 42 inspections. Since 2010, the number of annual IAEA and European 
Commission inspections has been around 20. The implementation of the IAEA integrated 
safeguards since 2008 in force in Finland reduces the total number of annual routine 
inspections days of the international inspectorates but includes short-notice random 
inspections. In order to be present at all the short-notice IAEA inspections, STUK has had a 
daily on-call inspector.
In 2019, STUK performed 27 safeguards inspections on the material balance areas of the 
Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), eight at Loviisa NPP and 19 at Olkiluoto NPP. According to 
the IAEA state-level approach for Finland, five short-notice inspections were carried out, three 
short-notice random inspections (SNRI) at Olkiluoto, one at Loviisa, and one complementary 
access (CA) at Olkiluoto. This was the highest number of IAEA short-notice activities in 
Finland so far. STUK performed one non-destructive assay measurement campaign at 
Olkiluoto NPP. These, in particular the passive gamma emission tomography (PGET) tests, were 
followed and performed by the IAEA and European Commission staff members, increasing 
the number of inspection days. At other facilities, the Commission took part in accountancy 
inspections and physical inventory verifications at the VTT Research Reactor and Centre for 
Nuclear Safety and at the University of Helsinki. The total number of safeguards inspections in 
2019 was 42 for STUK, 21 for the Commission and 18 for the IAEA. The IAEA sent its safeguards 
statements to the Commission, which amended them with its own conclusions and remarks, 
and forwarded them to STUK. The conclusions by the Commission were in line with the IAEA’s 
findings and conclusions as well as with STUK’s own findings; there were no outstanding 
questions from the IAEA or the Commission at the end of 2019, which could not be answered 
and clarified.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities continued to demonstrate 
that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no 
indications of undeclared materials or activities, and the inspected materials and activities 
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were in accordance with the stakeholders’ declarations. Neither the IAEA nor the European 
Commission made any remarks, nor did they present any required actions based on their 
inspections. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the 
stakeholders enabled Finland to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements 
relevant to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation.
STUK safeguards development work continued in 2019. The main development project is 
the GOSSER project, which proceeded to the second phase. In this phase, the development of 
the practical safeguards implementation of the national safeguards concept for the spent fuel 
disposal is the ultimate target. The GOSSER II project plan has been prepared for the period 
2019–2022. Other important development work started in 2019 includes legislation-related 
functions such as to review and update Finnish nuclear energy legislation and to prepare 
for future challenges in bookkeeping and reporting with distributed ledger and blockchain 
techniques. More emphasis on ensuring competence and workload control in the Safeguards 
Section now and in the future was also started.
STUK's Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section cooperates closely with the IAEA to share 
experiences and train authorities’ staff in countries aiming at nuclear programmes such as 
uranium production or nuclear energy. This context was enlarged and in 2019 focused on 
Tanzania and Vietnam in EU-financed projects. The cooperation with Saudi Arabia continued 
in 2019.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related 
activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach this goal, major steps must be 
taken in the political arena, and an important prerequisite for positive political action is for 
the verification system of the CTBTO to be functioning and able to assure all parties that it is 
impossible to carry out a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed 
to its own role in the common endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can 
accomplish its detection task. While still incomplete, the verification system has clearly 
demonstrated its ability to detect nuclear tests.
The outcome of the supervision and activities carried out in 2019 is that implementation of 
nuclear non-proliferation in Finland has achieved its objectives.
47STUK-B 246 / MAY 2020
6 Publications
Hämäläinen M, Honkamaa T, Martikka E, Moring M, Okko O. 15 Years of Safeguards-by-Design 
in Finland. ESARDA 41st Annual Meeting Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material 
Management, 14–16 May 2019, Stresa, Italy, pp. 842–847.
Honkamaa T, Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards, Annual Report 2019, STUK. 
https://www.julkari.fi/handle/10024/139155
Honkamaa T, Ansaranta T, Hämäläinen M, Heinonen J, Ilander T, Martikka E, Moring M. Digital 
Declaration Site Maps of Additional Protocol are Digitalization at State Level. ESARDA 41st 
Annual Meeting Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, 14–16 May 
2019, Stresa, Italy, pp. 946–949.
Honkamaa T, Hämäläinen M, Martikka E. Moring M, Okko O, Tupasela T. National Safeguards 
Concept for Encapsulation Plant and Geological Repository. ESARDA 41st Annual Meeting 
Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, 14–16 May 2019, Stresa, Italy, pp. 
235–239.
Honkamaa T, Tupasela T, Moring M. Combined PGET and PNAR System for Spent Fuel 
Verification. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Annual Meeting Proceedings 2019.
Khrustalev K, Lahti M, Martikka E, Honkamaa T, Moring M, Murtezi M, Park W-S, Tsvetkov 
I, Baird K. Potential SG equipment infrastructure for the Geological Repository in Finland. 
ESARDA 41st Annual Meeting Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, 
14–16 May 2019, Stresa, Italy pp. 240–246.
Okko O (ed.). Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, 
international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 
2018. STUK-B 233. Helsinki: Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority; 2019.
Tupasela T. Passive neutron albedo reactivity assay of spent nuclear fuel. Aalto University, 
Master’s thesis, https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/39825.
48 STUK-B 246 / MAY 2020
Tupasela T, Honkamaa T, Moring M, Turunen M. Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) 
Prototype for Spent Nuclear Fuel Verification. ESARDA 41st Annual Meeting Symposium on 
Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, 14–16 May 2019, Stresa, Italy, pp. 29–35.
Vincze A, Jansson P, Martikka E, Niemeyer I, Bonino F, Hildingsson L, Janssens WA, Funk P, 
Koutsoyannopoulos C, Okko O, Sevini F. Outcome and Actions of the 2019 Reflection Group 
of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA). Institute of 
Nuclear Materials Management, Annual Meeting Proceedings 2019.
49STUK-B 246 / MAY 2020
7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement concerning the 
International Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 
Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of the Council 
of the European Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (such as in ‘protective measures 
taken against CBRN weapons or hazards’)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization
DIQ
Design Information Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
Enhanced FORK with a CdZnTe-gamma 
spectrometer (see FORK)
EPGR
Encapsulation Plant and Geological 
Repository
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards Research and 
Development Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment according to the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
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FiNDC
Finnish National Data Centre for the 
CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA 
Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with gross gamma and 
neutron detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium, 20% or more of 
U-235
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IMS
International Monitoring System of the 
CTBTO
ITU
Institute of Transuranium Elements in 
Karlsruhe
INFCIRC
Information Circular (IAEA document 
type, e.g. INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty)
INMM
Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management
IPNDV
International Partnership for Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification
IPPAS
International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory Service
ITWG
International Technical Working Group 
for combating illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium, less than 20% of 
U-235
LUT
Lappeenranta-Lahti University of 
Technology
LINSSI
An SQL database for gamma-ray 
spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
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MEAE
Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MSSP
Member State Support Programme (to 
the IAEA)
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/140, “Non-
Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRRC
KSA Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory 
Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development /Nuclear Energy 
Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock characterisation 
facility (for the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PGET
Passive Gamma Emission Tomography
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory Verification
PNAR
Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity
PSP
Particular Safeguards Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory in the CTBT 
IMS network hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SMR
Small Modular Reactor
SNRI
Short Notice Random Inspection
52 STUK-B 246 / MAY 2020
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced inspection, 
complementary access, on-call inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting for and 
Control of Nuclear Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the CTBTO)
YVL Guide
Regulatory Guide on Nuclear Safety 
(STUK requirements on safety, 
security and safeguards, in Finnish 
Ydinvoimalaitosohje)
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APPENDIX 1 
Nuclear materials in Finland 2019
TABLE A1. Summary of fresh nuclear fuel receipts in 2019.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 100 17 657
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 Sweden 98 17 216
Olkiluoto 3, W0L3 No imports 0 0
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 169 21 167
FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium.
TABLE A2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2019
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1 159/579 197 334 936
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1 285/717 215 845 1 121
Olkiluoto 3, W0L3 245/0 130 784 0
Olkiluoto, spent fuel storage, 
W0LS
8 032/8 032 1 352 198 11 562
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 6 471/5 713 753 752 7 261
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) Fuel assemblies (FA) in the core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor in units 1 and 2)
TABLE A3. Total amounts of nuclear materials at 31 December 2019
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 197 391 – 937 –
W0L2 – 215 891 – 1 121 –
W0L3 – 130 784 10.5 – –
W0LS – 1 352 198 – 11 562 –
WL0V – 753 753 – 7 261 –
WRRF 92.8 27.6 0.001 < 0.001 –
WNSC 0.282 2.22 - < 0.001 0.044
WHEL 10.8 0.284 0.005 0.002 1.08
WFRS 34.9 0.537 208 <0.001 2.89
WTAL 1.36 – – – –
WKK0 2 915 – – – –
WNNH 3 588 – – – –
Minor holders 0.989 – 1 093 – 0.249
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT  Research Reactor, WNSC = VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, WHEL = University of 
Helsinki, WFRS = STUK, WTAL = Terrafame Oy, in Sotkamo, WKK0 = Freeport Cobalt Oy, in Kokkola, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel 
Harjavalta, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g total of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 
Safeguards field activities in 2019
Inspections Inspection person days
MBA/operator Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
TVO 10.1. International NM transfers   1   1
WL0V 22.1. Follow up inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 23.–24.1. Camera installations LO1/LO2 1 1 1 2 2 2
SSFPOSI 4.2. Site   1   2
Dragon Mining 5.2. System inspection (U in milling)   1   2
S SF VTT 22.2. STUK CA   1   2
W0LS, S SSFOLKI 13.3. PIV (Cover installation), site 1 1 2 1 1 2
SF0459CA 14.3. PIV   1   1
WL0V 19.3. Site   1   2
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 16.–17.4. Pre-PIT OL1/OL2, seals W0LS 3 3 3 3 3 3
WTAL 17.4. DIV, PIV   2   2
W0L2 24.5. OL2 CV   1   1
WRRF 4.6. PIV  1 1  1 1
WNSC 5.6. PIV  1 1  1 1
WHEL 6.6. PIV  1 1  1 1
W0L1 9.6. OL1 CV   1   1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 18.–19.6. Post-PIT+PIV: W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 24.6. RII 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LS 22.–26.7. NDA (PNAR+PGET)   1   11
WL0V 31.7. Pre-PIT 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 26.8. LO2 CV   1   1
W0LS 29.8. RII 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 15.9. LO1 CV   1   1
WL0V 9.–10.10. Post-PIT 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LF, W0LE 14.–17.10. W0LF DIV, W0LE DIV 2 2 2 7 15 4
SSFOLKI 17.10. CA 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 30.–31.10. System inspection   1   6
W0L3 19.11. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 20.11. RII 1 1 1 1 1 1
TVO 4.12. International NM transfers   1   1
W0LE, W0LF 9.12. Interim   2   2
W0LE, W0LF 10.12. Closing of requirements   1   1
W0L2 10.12. Interim   1   1
WFRS 18.12. PIV   1   3
Total 18 21 42 24 35 66
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APPENDIX 3 
International agreements relevant 
to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concerning safeguards of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear items in Finland (Finnish Treaty Series, FTS):
Treaties and international organisations 
to which Finland is a party:
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; adopted in London, Moscow and 
Washington on 1 July 1968 (1970), INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 March 
1957:
• Regulation No 5, amendment of the list in Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
• Regulation No 9, article 197, point 4 of the Euratom Treaty, on determining concentrations of 
ores, 2 February 1960.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Finland 
on January 15, 1999 but will not enter into force before it is ratified by all 44 states listed in 
Annex II of the Treaty.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (since 1958)
• Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (since 1976)
• International Energy Agency (since 1992).
Safeguards Agreements based on Non-Proliferation Treaty:
The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the Republic of Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
the Kingdom of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 1973. Valid for Finland from 1 
October 1995.
The Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, 
the Republic of Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
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of Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, 
the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
in Implementation of Article iii, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered into force on 30 April 2004.
Finland is a party to the following international conventions among others (the year when the 
convention entered into force for Finland is given in brackets):
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; opened for signature in Vienna and 
New York on 3 March 1980 (1989).
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; as amended on 
8 July 2005 (2016).
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; opened for signature in Vienna on 26 
September 1986 (1987).
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; opened 
for signature in Vienna on 26 September 1986 (1990).
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy; adopted in Paris on 29 July 
1960 (1972).
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy; adopted in Brussels on 31 January 1963 (1977).
Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material; 
adopted in Brussels on 17 December 1971 (1991).
The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Paris Convention and the Vienna 
Convention; adopted in Vienna on 21 September 1988 (1995).
Convention on Nuclear Safety; opened for signature in Vienna on 20 September 1994 (1996).
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management, adopted on 29 September 1997 in Vienna (2001).
Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in Connection with Radiation Accidents; 
adopted in Vienna on 17 October 1963 (1965) Agreement on common Nordic guidelines on 
communications concerning the siting of nuclear installations in border areas; adopted on 15 
November1976 (1976).
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APPENDIX 3 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IN FINLAND
The Agreement between Finland and Sweden on the guidelines to be followed while exporting 
nuclear material, technology or equipment, 4 March 1983 (FTS 20/1983).
Agreements relating to early notification of nuclear events and exchange of information on 
safety of nuclear facilities with Denmark (1987), Norway (1987), Sweden (1987), Germany (1993), 
the Russian Federation (1996) and Ukraine (1996).
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessments in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991).
As of 1 January 1995, Finland has been a member of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC or Euratom). Consequently, the following agreements are applied in Finland:
The Agreement between the Government of Republic of Finland and the Government of 
Canada and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities and 
information transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 43/76). Substituted to the 
appropriate extent by the Agreement with the Government of Canada and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 6 October 1959, 
as amended.
The Agreement between the Government of Republic of Finland and the Government of 
Australia concerning the transfer of nuclear material between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the European Atomic Energy Community ty concerning transfer of nuclear material from 
Australia to the European Atomic Energy Community, 21 September 1981.
The Agreement for Cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic Energy Community and the USA, 12 April 1996.
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Government of Japan, 27 February 2006.
The Agreement Between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 28 April 2005.
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 4 December 
2006.
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The Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
21.10.2003.
The Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the Argentine Republic, 
30.10.1997.
The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 
31.7.2013.
The Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the 
Government of the United States of Brazil for cooperation concerning the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy, 24.6.1965.
Bilateral Safeguards Agreements made by Finland:
The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force 
on 1.1.2015 (FTS 5/2015).
The Agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force 
on 6.4.2015 (FTS 32/2015).
The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Republic of Finland, 
entered into force on 3.6.2017 (FTS 48/2017).
The Agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III and X expired on 20 February 1999.
The Agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) and 
the Government of the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 expired on 1.12.2004.
The Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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The Agreement on implementation of the Agreement with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
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